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Abstract 
 
 
In this study, we examine whether or not the adoption of value-added tax (VAT) in 
developing countries is an effective way of stabilising tax revenues. Using a large panel of 
103 developing countries observed over 1980-2008 and several alternative estimation 
methods in order to deal with the self-selection bias and the endogeneity issue inherent in 
VAT adoption, we found robust evidence that the presence of VAT leads to significantly 
lower tax revenue instability. On average, countries with VAT experience 40-50% less tax 
revenue instability than countries which do not have a VAT system. These effects decrease 
with the level of economic development and the openness of trade. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last 20 years, a large number of countries have implemented major tax reforms, 
mainly by adopting value-added tax (VAT). As a result, at the beginning of the 2010s, more 
than 130 countries worldwide had VAT, and among the developing countries, around 70% 
(104 out of 144) had adopted this kind of indirect taxation. VAT has tended to spread in 
regional bursts, in countries participating in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes 
and in countries with a low tax revenue performance in the past (Keen and Lockwood, 2010).  
Several papers have assessed the gains associated with switching to VAT with regard to 
various outcomes. Gordon and Nielsen (1997) show that by relying more on VAT than on 
income tax, it is possible to decrease the real cost of evasion activities. After computing 
estimates of the marginal cost of public funds for five tax instruments in 36 African countries, 
Auriol and Warlters (2011) found that, on average within the sample, VAT was the tax 
instrument with the lowest marginal cost of funds. A large body of literature on tax-tariff 
reforms1 has also established that a rise in domestic consumption taxes, most notably in VAT, 
in order to compensate for a decrease in import tariffs can improve welfare (Michael et al., 
1993; Hatzipanayotou et al., 1994; Abe, 1995; Keen and Ligthart, 2002). However, Emran 
and Stiglitz (2005) questioned this result in the presence of a large informal sector, while 
Keen (2008) found that if both VAT and the practice of withholding taxes are deployed, tax-
tariff reforms lead to a rise in welfare, even in the presence of a large informal sector. Finally, 
Keen and Lockwood (2010) found that the introduction of VAT has been globally associated 
with significantly more tax revenues being collected, even though its impact is modest in 
terms of size.  
Beyond these identified consequences of reliance on a VAT system, one largely 
unexplored aspect is whether or not VAT also permits the stabilisation of tax revenues. From 
Table 1, we can see that, since the 1980s, developing countries have experienced much 
greater tax revenue instability than developed economies. Tax instability has decreased over 
time in developing countries but, in the 2000s, it remained significantly larger than in the 
OECD countries. The two regions of the world which exhibit the highest degree of tax 
instability are the Middle East and North Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 For a quantification of the relative marginal welfare costs of trade and commodity taxes, but not for VAT in 
particular, see also Clarete and Whaley (1987). 
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Table 1. Tax instability in OECD countries and developing countries 
 1980’s 1990’s 2000’s 
    OECD 1.093 0.920 1.002 
Developing countries 2.379 2.369 1.891 
East Asia and the Pacific     2.397     2.297     1.823 
Europe and Central Asia    -     2.937     1.766 
Latin America and Caribbean     2.195     1.904     1.535 
Middle East and North Africa     2.247     2.605     2.435 
South Asia     2.224     1.717     1.206 
Sub-Saharan Africa     2.473     2.564     2.099 
Note: Instability of the tax revenue ratio over GDP calculated as the standard deviation of  
the change in the variable over the decades. 
 
 
The instability of tax revenues is of great concern, especially for developing countries, since it 
leads to volatility of much-needed public expenditures (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995; 
Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). Bleaney et al. (1995) found that from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, 
the tax structure was an important factor in the stabilisation of revenues, with indirect 
domestic taxes producing a stabilising effect. Ebeke and Ehrhart (2011) confirmed this result 
for the period 1980-2005 for the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, and added that the 
stabilising effect had been reinforced since the mid-1990s. The aim of this paper is therefore 
to assess whether or not the adoption of a particular type of domestic indirect taxation, namely 
VAT, leads to the enhancement of the stability of tax revenues in developing countries. Using 
a panel of 103 countries over the period 1980-2008, we apply several estimation methods, 
controlling for endogeneity and self-selection issues, in order to generate robust results on the 
impact of the introduction of VAT on the stability of tax revenues. 
To summarise our results, we found that VAT does indeed have a stabilising effect on the 
tax revenue ratio. Countries which have adopted the VAT system enjoy much more stable tax 
revenue than other countries. This effect is particularly important in low-income countries and 
in the context of low exposure to external shocks through open trade. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the reasons why the adoption of 
VAT can have a stabilising effect. The estimation methodology is depicted in section 3 and 
section 4 reveals the results regarding the impact of VAT on tax revenue volatility. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The stabilising effect of VAT 
 
VAT is a “broad-based tax levied at multiple stages of production, with – crucially – 
taxes on inputs credited against taxes on output” (Ebrill et al., 2001, p. 3). This tax has been 
adopted in replacement of other sales taxes (either retail sales tax or turnover tax) and, 
according to its definition, the key advantage is that revenue is secured by being collected 
throughout the production process – unlike a retail sales tax (Cnossen, 2009) – but without 
cascading and distorting production decisions, unlike a turnover tax (Bird and Gendron, 
2007). VAT is therefore less vulnerable to evasion than a retail sales tax, for which collection 
occurs during the final stage of production. However, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) 
emphasise that VAT collection efficiency remains largely dependent on the quality of 
enforcement and the efficiency of monitoring, which both increase with political stability and 
the ease and fluidity of political participation. Moreover, increased expenditure on the 
administration of VAT and more experience with VAT have been found to be significantly 
associated with increased compliance (Agha and Haughton, 1996). Fortunately, the adoption 
of VAT is generally part of wider tax system reforms, aiming to improve tax administration 
and compliance. 
 
Two main reasons can be postulated as to why the adoption and the presence of VAT in a 
country can lead to enhanced tax stability. 
The first reason derives from the fact that VAT can generate more stable revenues than 
the retail sales tax that it often replaces. Indeed, as emphasised above, VAT is collected 
throughout the entire value-added chain, and so if one part of this chain is hit by an 
idiosyncratic shock, the tax revenues collected from the remaining parts of the value-added 
chain may still be secured. Therefore, the collection of VAT revenues at numerous stages of 
the value-added chain can diversify the risk and render tax revenues less sensitive to shocks, 
and thus more stable, than in a situation in which consumption taxes are collected only at the 
final retail stage. 
Second, the adoption of VAT has been found to be associated with a rise in the level of 
tax being collected (Keen and Lockwood, 2010), with the relative shares of tax revenue 
originating from tariffs and income taxes respectively therefore being reduced. This idea is 
reinforced by the fact that VAT implementation often occurs in the context of trade 
liberalisation, in an attempt to recover lost revenues from tariffs from domestic sources 
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(Keen, 2009; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). The presumption is that, since VAT relies mainly 
on final consumption2 and this component is relatively more stable than exports, imports or 
companies’ profits, a greater reliance on VAT revenues for tax mobilisation (rather than on 
income taxes or import duties) is expected to stabilise tax revenues (Bleaney et al., 1995; 
Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). 
 
 
 
3. Estimation method 
 
3.1.Data and methodology 
 
 
Our dataset consists of 103 developing countries observed over the period 1980-2008 
(see Appendix 1). According to Figure 1, preliminary evidence shows that the average level 
of tax instability in countries without VAT is significantly larger than in countries that have 
adopted VAT. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Tax revenue instability in countries with and without a VAT 
 
 Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Even though, on average, around 55% of VAT is collected at borders on imports (Ebrill et al., 2001), 
the remaining 45% relies on domestic consumption and is therefore more likely to be stable. 
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In order to assess the effect of the adoption of VAT on the instability of government 
revenues, the estimated econometric model is as follows: 
tititititi uXVAT ,
'
,2,1, )log( ελββασ +++++=  
where i and t are indicators of the country and year, respectively and ti ,σ , the instability of the 
tax revenue to GDP ratio, is the dependent variable.3 The use of the standard deviation to 
measure instability is widely supported in the literature. However, as highlighted by Nelson 
and Plosser (1982), macroeconomic data are integrated of order 1, and so we apply the first-
difference operator to these data in order to ensure that they are stationary before measuring 
the standard deviation. Hence, our measure of instability is the standard deviation of the 
change in the variable over five-year non-overlapping sub-periods, as in Bleaney et al. (1995) 
and Combes and Ebeke (2011). tiVAT ,
 
is a dummy for the presence of VAT and equals 1 
when VAT is present for at least three years inside the five-year sub-period. The six sub-
periods are 1980-1984; 1985-1989; 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 and 2005-2008. The 
vector '
,tiX  captures other explanatory variables, which are discussed in greater detail below, 
which affect the instability of tax revenues. The terms iu  and tλ  are country-specific and 
time-specific effects, respectively, and ti ,ε  is an unobserved random error term. 
 
The matrix of control variables includes the standard determinants of tax revenue 
instability (see Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995; Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). Among the 
structural factors are GDP per capita, trade openness and the level of natural resource rent. 
The level of economic development (GDP per capita) would be negatively associated with the 
instability of taxes, because it is a proxy for the degree of risk management and the 
diversification of production activities, which can lower the degree of volatility. The 
contribution of trade openness to tax instability is less striking. On the one hand, trade 
openness may act as a proxy for an openness policy, behind which exists a willingness to 
provide better management of economic affairs, as well as good institutions and policies for 
competitiveness. On the other hand, trade openness may be a proxy for the “natural openness” 
which increases the vulnerability of a small open economy to external shocks. Overall, the 
sign of the coefficient of the trade openness variable (exports plus imports divided by the 
GDP) is ambiguous. We expect to find a positive association between the levels of natural 
resource rent and tax revenue instability, because the price of natural resources is known to be 
                                                 
3
 By using a log-linear specification, we ensured that the fitted values for i,t were strictly positive and we can 
directly interpret the estimated parameters as semi-elasticities. 
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highly volatile. The other determinants are the instability of GDP per capita, inflation 
instability, the level of inflation and the presence of elections. We expect all of these variables 
to be associated with increased tax revenue instability. Data for government revenues, 
excluding grants, are drawn from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics and completed using 
Article IV data. The dummy executive election variable is taken from the Database of 
Political Institutions and all other variables are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
 
3.2.Endogeneity and self-selection issues 
 
The OLS estimator does not take into account the fact that the presence of VAT is not 
assigned to countries at random. In fact, a country could choose to adopt this taxation system 
in order to enhance its tax collection and also to enjoy more stable revenues through the 
taxation of a specific component of the tax base (here, private consumption) which is more 
stable than the other components of the tax base. Therefore, in order to ensure that the 
estimated effect is the correct one, it is necessary to deal with the self-selection bias, which is 
another reason that an explanatory variable, namely the VAT dummy, may be endogenous 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
In order to correct for this endogeneity bias, we resorted to an instrumental variables 
technique. As external instruments for the adoption of VAT, we use the lagged percentage of 
geographical neighbours that have already adopted VAT and the lagged value of the level of 
the tax revenue ratio, which are two variables that Keen and Lockwood (2010) found to be 
significant determinants of VAT adoption. The first instrument is expected to be positively 
correlated with the presence of VAT because of neighbourhood imitation effects but should 
not have any direct impact on the instability of tax revenues. The second instrument is used to 
capture the idea that countries with initially lower tax revenue performances receive higher 
marginal benefits from the adoption of VAT. We rely on the 2SLS estimator, as using a linear 
regression for the first-stage estimates generates consistent second-stage estimates, even with 
a dummy endogenous variable (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). However, given that VAT is a 
dummy variable, we also employ, as a robustness test, an estimation method which uses a 
probit model in the first stage, rather than a linear regression model.4 
 
                                                 
4
 We use the routine treatreg in StataCorp which is suited to binary endogenous regressors (see Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). 
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4. Results 
 
4.1.The impact of VAT on tax revenue instability 
 
The results with the instrumental variable estimators are presented in Table 2. The first-
stage estimations with the 2SLS estimator are displayed in columns 5 and 6, while the results 
of the corresponding second-stage estimations are shown in columns 1 and 2. The results of 
the first-stage estimations of VAT adoption (columns 5 and 6) indicate that the external 
instruments (the lagged share of neighbours with VAT and the lagged level of tax revenues) 
are statistically significant and the F-test statistics are above 10, indicating the strength of our 
two instruments. In column 1, the results highlight a negative and significant effect of the 
presence of VAT on tax revenue volatility. We do not reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen 
test, which means that our instruments are valid. In the second column, with some additional 
control variables, the effect of VAT remains significantly negative at the 5% level, indicating 
that VAT reduces tax revenue instability. When taking into account the fact that our 
endogeneous variable of interest is a dummy, we obtain the results presented in column 3. 
The first-stage probit model of VAT adoption is displayed in column 7. The negative impact 
of VAT on tax revenue instability holds and is significant at the 1% level.  
In column 4, we consider the possibility that tax revenue instability may be persistent. The 
lagged level of the dependent variable is therefore included in order to discern any persistency 
which might characterise the dynamics of tax revenue instability. The IV-FE estimator 
becomes inconsistent because the lagged level of tax instability is correlated with the error 
term due to the presence of country fixed effects (Nickell, 1981). One way to handle these 
issues is to use the generalised method of moments (GMM; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The 
system-GMM estimator combines, within a system, first-difference equations, where the 
right-hand-side variables are instrumented by lagged levels of the series with an additional set 
of equations in levels, using the lagged first differences of the series as instruments. We use 
our two external instruments (lagged share of neighbours with VAT and lagged tax revenues) 
for the dummy VAT. The first- and second-order autocorrelation tests of the residuals in the 
first difference (AR(1) and AR(2) tests) and the Hansen test confirm the validity of our 
estimation with the two external instruments. The results remain unchanged: the presence of 
VAT leads to more stable tax revenues. The average effect stands at exp(-0.658) = 0.52; 
therefore, countries with a VAT system experience approximately 48% less tax instability 
than countries without VAT.  
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Table 2. The effect of VAT on tax revenue instability - Instrumental variable techniques 
  Tax Instability (log) VAT adoption 
 2SLS 2SLS Treatreg IV 
GMM-
System 
First Stage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Dummy VAT -1.007** -0.978** -0.916*** -0.658**    
 (0.503) (0.494) (0.219) (0.335)    
Log Tax instability (lag)    0.245***    
    (0.086)    
GDP pc (log) -0.009 -0.0004 0.136** 0.150 0.134 0.137 0.714*** 
 (0.283) (0.284) (0.058) (0.096) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) 
Instability GDP pc (log) 0.0642 0.0631 0.105** 0.0982* 0.00004 -0.0004 -0.0834 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.048) (0.052) (0.028) (0.028) (0.100) 
Inflation (log) 0.452** 0.463** 0.236 0.169 0.130 0.133* -0.413 
 (0.182) (0.183) (0.197) (0.155) (0.073) (0.074) (0.440) 
Inflation instability (log) 0.0227 0.0202 0.0818* 0.0544 0.00285 0.0023 0.0821 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.213) (0.021) (0.099) 
Openness (log) 0.169 0.0647 0.281*** 0.176* 0.0655 0.0488 -0.479** 
 (0.226) (0.232) (0.078) (0.092) (0.104) (0.11) (0.189) 
Oil rent (log)  0.148 0.166*** 0.117**  0.0326 -0.172** 
  (0.124) (0.037) (0.050)  (0.060) (0.077) 
Executive Elections  0.0942 0.105 0.0708  -0.00095 0.455*** 
  (0.088) (0.084) (0.079)  (0.051) (0.166) 
Lagged Presence of VAT in 
the region 
    0.0081*** 0.0081*** 0.0172*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Lagged Tax Revenue     -0.0099* -0.0103* -0.0472*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) 
Observations 377 377 389 367 377 377 389 
Number of countries 103 103 103 99 103 103 103 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.658 0.823  0.309    
F-Test instruments     10.35 10.12  
Nb of instruments    23    
AR(1) test (p-val)    0.000    
AR(2) test (p-val)    0.353    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. A constant and time and country 
fixed effects are included in all estimations. In the GMM-system estimation, the one-step estimator is used with 
robust standard errors. Elections, inflation, inflation instability, oil rent and GDP instability are considered as 
exogenous. The lagged dependent variable and the level of GDP per capita are instrumented with first-order to 
fourth-order lagged values. We include the lagged presence of VAT in the region and the lagged tax revenue as 
external instrument for the adoption of VAT. The matrix of instruments has been collapsed. 
 
 
The results in Table 2 also highlight the fact that the presence of VAT is not the only 
significant determinant of the volatility of government tax revenues. Indeed, it appears that an 
unstable macroeconomic environment (high inflation and growth volatility) fuels the volatility 
of tax revenues, a result which is consistent with previous studies (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 
1995; Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). 
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Regardless of the instrumental variable estimator used, the results confirm the main 
hypothesis presented in this paper, namely that countries which have adopted a VAT system 
enjoy much more stable tax revenues than countries which have not. 
 
4.2.Accounting for heterogeneity in the impact 
 
Having established a robust stabilising impact of the presence of VAT on the tax revenue 
ratio, this paper extends the analysis by testing for the existence of heterogeneous effects of 
VAT. We argue that some countries are better equipped to enjoy the stabilising effect of VAT 
than others. This paper follows Keen and Lockwood (2010) in terms of the choice of 
conditional variables. Indeed, these authors found that VAT is more likely to increase the total 
tax revenue ratio as the levels of per capita income and trade openness increase. Therefore, 
our paper extends this analysis by testing the effect of these two variables (per capita GDP and 
trade openness) on the sensitivity of the instability of tax revenues with regard to the presence 
of VAT.  
 
The previous econometric model is modified slightly in order to allow an interactive term 
of the dummy VAT to be crossed with each of the two conditional variables while controlling 
additively for each component of the interactive term. Keen and Lockwood (2010) argued that 
VAT is more likely to increase tax revenues in countries with relatively high levels of GDP 
per capita and trade openness for the following two reasons. First, countries with a higher 
income cope more easily with the distinct administrative and compliance requirements of 
VAT. Second, VAT collections at borders typically account for a large part of the total VAT 
revenues in most developing countries. All else being equal, one would therefore expect VAT 
to function better in more open economies, since the tax base is more readily accessible. How 
does this translate into the analysis of tax revenue stability? Are the effects found by Keen and 
Lockwood (2010) regarding the impact of the levels of economic development and trade 
openness on the relationship between the level of tax revenues and the presence of VAT 
similar to those that can be estimated in the case of the stability of the tax revenue ratio? 
  
This paper hypothesises that the effect of the levels of economic development and trade 
openness on the strength of the negative relationship between VAT and the instability of tax 
revenues is unclear regarding the level of economic development, but clearer regarding the 
trade openness variable. On the one hand, one could argue that the implementation of VAT is 
less difficult for countries which have already attained a relatively high level of economic 
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development, and that they can therefore better enjoy the stabilising properties of this taxation 
instrument. On the other hand, the marginal benefits in terms of tax revenue stability of 
having VAT may be higher in low-income countries because they are less diversified and 
suffer most from high levels of output volatility (Koren and Tenreyro, 2007). Therefore, 
reliance upon VAT in these countries could help to overcome the strong macroeconomic 
instability of the environment by taxing an aggregate which represents a high proportion of 
domestic wealth and, at the same time, is among the more stable aggregates.  
Regarding the role of the trade openness variable, one would expect the presence of VAT 
to have a marginal stabilising effect which would decrease with the degree of trade openness. 
Based on the finding that trade openness is a source of macroeconomic volatility in 
developing countries (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009), one could expect that a VAT 
system (which is less dependent upon the external sector) would help to stabilise tax revenues. 
The results of econometric investigations are presented in Table 3. Due to the strong 
inertia which characterises the tax revenue instability variable, the econometric model 
includes the lagged dependent variable and is estimated using the system-GMM estimator. 
Column 1 adds an interactive term of VAT crossed with GDP per capita. The results indicate 
a significant and positive sign of the coefficient associated with the interactive variable while 
the coefficient of the VAT dummy exhibits a significantly negative sign. This means that the 
stabilising effect of VAT decreases with the level of development. Based on the two 
coefficients associated with the VAT dummy, we computed the GDP threshold beyond which 
the stabilising effect of VAT disappears. It stands at $8,224 US, which corresponds to the 
category of upper-middle-income countries ($3,976 to $12,275 US), according to the World 
Bank’s income classification. This result highlights the fact that VAT helps to reduce the 
volatility of public tax revenues, especially amongst the low-income and lower-middle-
income countries. 
In column 2, the results suggest a marginal stabilising effect of VAT which decreases 
with the degree of trade openness. Indeed, the coefficient of the additive term of the VAT 
dummy is negative, whereas that which corresponds to the interactive term exhibits a positive 
sign. This result highlights the fact that the benefit of VAT in terms of tax revenue stability is 
higher when the level of trade openness is lower. However, the relatively high value of the 
estimated trade openness threshold suggests that in our sample, the bulk of countries are all 
located in the stabilising area of the effect of VAT. 
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Table 3. Heterogeneous impact of the VAT  
 Tax instability (log) 
 GMM-System 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Dummy VAT -3.651*** -2.095** 
 (1.411) (0.891) 
VAT x GDP pc (log) 0.405**  
 (0.185)  
VAT x Lagged Openness (log)  0.386* 
  (0.206) 
Lagged tax instability (log) 0.261*** 0.205** 
 (0.0893) (0.0848) 
GDP pc (log) -0.242 0.144 
 (0.158) (0.111) 
GDP pc instability (log) 0.0898* 0.0897* 
 (0.0532) (0.0502) 
Inflation (log) 0.211 0.212 
 (0.166) (0.172) 
Inflation instability (log) 0.0174 0.0474 
 (0.0459) (0.0462) 
Oil rent (log) 0.172*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0517) 
Openness (log) 0.308***  
 (0.0971)  
Lagged Openness (log)   0.0803 
  (0.138) 
Executive Elections 0.0694 0.0723 
 (0.0823) (0.0757) 
   
Observations 367 366 
Number of countries 99 99 
Joint significance of VAT coefficients: p-value 0.014 0.046 
Threshold of the conditional variable $8,224USD 228% 
Number of instruments 25 25 
Hansen Test (p-val) 0.210 0.546 
AR1 Test (p-val) 0.000 0.000 
AR2 Test (p-val) 0.322 0.585 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. A constant and time and 
country fixed effects are included in all estimations. The one-step system-GMM is used. Elections, 
inflation, inflation instability, oil rent and GDP instability are considered as exogenous. The lagged 
dependent variable and the level of GDP per capita are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order 
lagged values. The dummy VAT and the dummy VAT crossed by each conditional variable (GDP and 
openness) are instrumented by external instruments lagged vat, lagged tax rev and their interactive terms 
with each of the conditional instruments. The matrix of instruments has been collapsed. 
 
 
These two results contrast with those of Keen and Lockwood (2010), who analysed the 
conditional impact of VAT on the level of the tax revenue ratio. Our paper shows that the 
level of economic development and the degree of trade openness reduce the marginal 
effectiveness of VAT in terms of tax revenue stabilisation, while Keen and Lockwood (2010) 
found that these factors increase the effectiveness of VAT in terms of revenue mobilisation. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigated whether the large wave of VAT adoption in developing 
countries over the last 20 years has permitted the stabilisation of their tax revenues. Using 
several alternative estimation methods in order to deal with the self-selection bias and the 
endogeneity issues inherent in VAT adoption, we found robust evidence that the presence of 
VAT leads to an enhancement in the stability of tax revenues. On average, countries with 
VAT experience 40-50% less tax revenue instability than countries without VAT. We 
established that this effect is stronger in low-income countries and in the context of low 
exposure to external shocks as a result of trade openness. 
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – List of 103 countries in the sample (Year of VAT adoption) 
Afghanistan, Albania (1996), Algeria (1992), Angola, Argentina (1975), Armenia (1992), 
Azerbaijan (1992), Bangladesh (1991), Belarus (1992), Belize (2006), Benin (1991), 
Bhutan, Bolivia (1973), Botswana (2002), Brazil (1967), Bulgaria (1994), Burkina Faso 
(1993), Burundi, Cambodia (1999), Cameroon (1999), Cape Verde (2004), Central African 
Republic (2001), Chad (2000), China (1994), Colombia (1975), Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo (1997), Costa Rica (1975), Cote d'Ivoire (1960), Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic (1983), Ecuador (1970), Egypt (1991), El Salvador (1992), Ethiopia 
(2003), Fiji (1992), Gabon (1995), The Gambia, Georgia (1992), Ghana (1998), Guatemala 
(1983), Guinea-Bissau, Haiti (1982), Honduras (1976), India (2005), Indonesia (1985), 
Islamic Rep.of Iran, Jamaica (1991), Jordan (1994), Kazakhstan (1992), Kenya (1990), 
Kyrgyz Republic (1992), Lao PDR (2004), Lesotho (2003), Liberia, Lithuania (1994), 
Madagascar (1994), Malawi (1989), Maldives, Malaysia, Mali (1991), Mauritania (1995), 
Mauritius (1998), Mexico (1980), Moldova (1992), Mongolia (1998), Morocco (1986), 
Mozambique (1999), Namibia (2000), Nepal (1997), Nicaragua (1975), Niger (1986), 
Nigeria (1994), Pakistan (1990), Panama (1977), Papua New Guinea (1999), Paraguay 
(1993), Peru (1973), Philippines (1988), Romania (1993), Rwanda (2001), Samoa (1994), 
Senegal (1980), South Africa (1991), Sri Lanka (1998), Sudan (2000), Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Tajikistan (1986), Tanzania (1998), Thailand (1992), Togo (1995), Tunisia 
(1988), Turkey (1985), Uganda (1996), Ukraine (1992), Uruguay (1968), Vanuatu (1998), 
Venezuela (1993), Vietnam (1999), Yemen (2005), Zambia (1995), Zimbabwe (2004). 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Tax instability (log) 389 0.449 0.808 -1.721 2.561 
Dummy VAT 389 0.622 0.485 0 1 
GDP per capita (log) 389 7.752 0.958 5.395 9.680 
GDP per capita volatility 389 0.808 0.821 -1.300 3.406 
Inflation (log) 389 4.769 0.327 4.574 7.799 
Inflation instability (log) 389 1.673 1.509 -1.259 9.190 
Oil rent (log) 389 0.752 1.163 0 4.301 
Openness (log) 389 4.170 0.527 2.644 5.337 
Elections 389 0.578 0.494 0 1 
Lagged share of the presence 
of VAT in the region 
389 35.006 24.712 0 82.857 
Lagged tax revenue  389 18.715 7.784 2.870 53.10 
 
 
 
